Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

John P. Condas et al v. George J. Condas et al : Brief
of Defendants-Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Claron C. Spencer; Attorney for Plaintiffs and Respondents;
Joseph Novak; Attorney for Defendants and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Condas v. Condas, No. 15669 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1118

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I:l

THE SUPREC1E COURT OF THE SHTE OF UTAH

JOHN P. CO~IDAS, GEORGE P.
CONDAS, HARRY P. CONDAS,
MARGARITA CREGLOW ELLIS
and TESSIE MADSEN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

CASE NO. 15669

'IS.

GEC•RGE J. COil :lAS, '1ARY
CQ~JAS LEHMER, CHRIS J.
CQ~DAS,
~ICK J. CONDAS,
ELLEN CO~JAS BAYAS,
ALE!ANDRA CO~DAS ~CKEY and
J. CD~DAS CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants and Anellants.

APPEAL FROM TYE JECREE OF THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT :NAND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
HONORABLE GEORGE E. SALLIF, JUDGE

A~

JOSEPH NOVAK
Attorney for De&endants and
Appell ants George J. Candas,
Mary Candas ~enmer, Chris J.
Candas, Nick J. Candas, Ell en
Candas Bayas and Alexandra
Candas Ockev
520 Cont;ne1~al Sank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
CL U, RIJ 'I ·: .
Attor~e:;
cJn•i

S J E ~ICE?

fc:Jr

Pla~ntif"'.;

~esJon:J~nc:

ili];J 3 r·efi:di

36 So·J

~

S~a~e

Sa 1 <: " k e ·= 1 c:1 .

S

~~2
r~~t

~an

J11er
: l 1~ 1

FILED
Jl1N 21 1978

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Clerk.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah
State Sup,..,.•
Library. Court, Uteh
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I:l THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN P. CONDAS, GEORGE P.
COr·WAS, HARRY P, CONDAS,
MARGARITA CREGLOW ELLIS
and TESSIE MADSEN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

CASE NO. 15669

vs .

,;EQRGE J. CO:WAS, MARY
CONDAS LEHME~. CHRIS J.
CONDAS, NICK J. CONDAS,
ELLE~ CONDAS BAYAS,
ALEXA~DRA CONDAS OCKEY and
J. CONDAS CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF

DEFE~OANTS-APP:LLANTS

AN APPEAL FROM THE DECREE OF THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE
JOSEPH NOVAK
for Defendants and
Appellants George J, Candas,
Mary Candas Lehmer, Chris J.
Candas, Nick J. Candas, Ellen
Candas Bayas and Alexandra
Candas Ockey
520 Continental 3ank Building
Salt ~ake City, Utah 84101
~ttorney

CLARO'! C. SPUICER
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and qesponden':s
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Stree~
Salt Lake City, JtaG 34111
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
STATE:-IT~T

OF THE

DISPOSITION

I~

KI~D

OF c.;;SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • 1

THE LOWER COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • • . . • . • • • • . • • 1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • 2
STXI'L'1E~;T

·OF F.;;CTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • . • . . . . • . 2

.\RG0:·1E:CJT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 9
?OVE'

I.

THE T?L:;.~ COURT E?3E::J I~ ..'-.::JMITTI::JG THE ABSTRACT
•OF ?.ECO?..J I::l SULLI':.:;::J •;. C:JclDAS : SUPRL'!E COURT
C.:\SE '10. 4 92 2; .:;:l::J THE 3RIEFS FIL.E::J THEREI:l AS
E'/I::JE~JCE I:i THIS C.:\SS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
?OI:lT :;: I.
TRL\L COC?.T ER?ELI I:l ITS .:..PPLICATIC~ OF THE
::JOCTRI:lE OF COLLX~E?AL SS'T'JPPEL TO THE :.:..CTS OF
THIS C.:;SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

THE: F:::'l::JI:lGS JF T!E T?.I.:'...L CJC?.T C'C:.C..T T2E RO.:..DW.:..Y

:;p ':iH:::TE P:::::JE c.:;:;yoc; y::::? JEFS:-lD..'-.:lTS' LA:JDS IS .:..
PC3L:::: ?CALi IS ~:lS~PPORTS2 3Y THE EVI::JE:JCE A::JD IS
.::DNT ?..C..?'-' TO THE C·'."ERI·:EE::..'l:::::JG tiE I GriT OF THE EVIQE~CE . . . 2 6
p

I '.

THE GE:JE?~:I.L ?:::';OI:JGS .::F ?.;CT OF .; PUSLIC ROAD ARE
CCNTt:lA::JICTE::J 3Y THE SPECI?:::C FI:lDI~GS OF FACT
THE::\EC·~; .:..:~0 ~!CST 3E SET .;SI::JE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
:::O'lCL:._·s::: Jt; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-lMachine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED

Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah
2d 281, 488 P.2d 738 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Callan v. Callan

(Wash.)

468 P.2d 456

Carter v. Carter, (utah)563 P.2d 177

(1970) . . . . • . . . . . . 22

(1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Chronister v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., (N.M.)
381 P.2d 673 (1963) . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Wright, (Utah)
521 P.2d 563 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., (Utah) 530 P. 2d 815
(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280,
Greener v.

Greener, 116 Utah 571,

391 P.2d 426
212 P.2d 194

(1964) .41
(1949) .. 10

Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175 P.2d
703 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28
(1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Jardine v. Archibald,

3 Utah 2d 88,

279 P.2d 454

(1955) .10

Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152
P.2d 98 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Lyman Grazing Assoc. v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473
P.2d 905 (1970) • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 Utah 2d 181,
290 P.2d 689 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 42
Mecham v. City of Glendale, 489 P.2d 65, 15 Ariz App.
502 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3' 24
Moon Lake Water Users Assoc. v. Hanson, (Utah) 535
P.2d 1262 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac.

1127

(1916) . . . . . . . 41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-iiMachine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.

CASES CITED

(cont.)

Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545
(1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 27,
Provo City v.

Lambert,

(Utah)

574 P.2d 727

(1978) . . . . 11

Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,
Robison v. Kelly,

69 Utah 376,

255 Pac.

41

430

24, 26

(1927) ... 21

Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ctah 511, 20
P.2d 618 (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Stanley

'7.

Stanley,

97 '-'tah 520,

94 P.2d 465

(1939) .. 11

State, in the Interest of Hales, (Utah) 538 P.2d
1034 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Sweeney '7. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113,
417 P.2d 126 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Thomson '-'·Candas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.:Zd
639 (l972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lJ.
~hompson

720

2"7,

41

v. ~elson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P.2d
(1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONSTITUTION AND RULES CITED

Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Rule 63 (3), U.R.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Rule 63(3) (b) (i) and (ii), U.R.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Rule 63(9), U.R.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l3,14,15
Rule 63(10), U.R.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l4,15,16,.'
Rule 63(15), U.R.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l8
Rule 6 3 ( 1 7 ) , U • R . E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 7 , l 8
Rule 68 (4), U.R.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Rule 72 (a), U.R.C.P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §597, p. 651. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §597, p. 652 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §738, pp. 807, 808 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §743, p. 812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §760, 761, 764, 765 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §762, p. 832 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, §76, p. 365 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §1260, p. 212 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Annotation:
11 A.L.R. 2d 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Annotation:
ll A.L.R. 2d 30, §32, p. 112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Annotation:
70 A.L.R. 2d 494 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Annotation:
74 A.L.R. 2d 521, 522 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
American Law of Institute, Model Code of
Evidence, Rule 508 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,U
American Law of Institute, Model Code of
Evidence, Rule 509 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,16
McCormick on Evidence, §245, p. 523 • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-i
Wigmore on Evidence, §l080(a), p. 195 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iiii-

I~

THE SUPREME COCRT OF THE STATE OF

~TAH

JOHN P. CONDAS, GEORGE P.
CONDAS, HA?.RY P. co;mAS
~RGARITA CREGLOW ELLIS
and TESSIE MADSEN,
Plainti:"fs and Respondents,
~,;rs

.

Case :Jo. 15669
:-;EO?GE J. CO~lDAS, 'lJ..?.Y
.::ONDAS LEfL'!ER, CHRIS J .
.::o:lDAS, :iiC!< J. CO~E:lAS,
ELLEN CONDAS 3AYAS,
,:O,:::.,EXANDP.A CO::'iDAS OCi<EY and
J. COcWAS CORPO?.ATION, a
~tah

corporat1on,

Defendants and Appellants.

ST.:'..TE..'1ENT OF THE KIN:

~F

C.~.SE

Actlon to establish a public roadway and/or a prescriptive
easement :"or a r'Jad·...,a:; across ::le:"endants-appellants lands in
;~hlte

Pine Canyon ln Su:nrnit County, c:'tah, and for injunctive

relief to orcer removal o: gates across t:.e roadway and to enjoin
defendants-appellants :"rom obstructing cr
~ra·1el

·1ehlcle or foot
~esponden~s

3long the

~c

with

or from plaintiffs-

lanes.
~ISP0SIT!C~

The

=oadwa~·

~ncerfering

tr~al

:o establlsn a

coJrt heli

~rescr~~:~ve

IN THE
t~at

~OWER

COCRT

plalntlffs-respondents failed

ease~ent

across defendants-appellants
Accordingly, it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(1) adjudging that the existing roadway up ',lhite Pine
Canyon is a public road as it passes through and beyond the
lands of defendants-appellants;
(2) ordering defendants-appellants to remove the gates
which they erected across said roadway; and
(3) enjoining defendants-appellants from interfering with
or in any manner obstructing the use of the roadway by plaintiC::srespondents and by the public generally through the lands of
defendants-appellants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek to reverse the whole of the
Decree and to remand the case to the lower court with i:-tstructions to enter an Amended Decree dismissing plaintiffs' Complair.:
and adjudging that the roadway across defendants-appellants
lands in

\~hite

Pine Canyon is their private roadway and ?lai:r::if:;-

respondents own no interest or right therein, or that failing, a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
To simplify matters, defendants-appellants collectively
will be referred to hereinafter as defendants and tJlaintiffsrespondents collectively will be referred to hereinafter as
plaintiffs and individual defendants or ?laintiffs will be
designated by name.
Defendants are the owners of approximately 2,600 acres
of land and plaintiffs are the owners of ap~roximately S40 acres
of land, both in the area of White Pine Canyon.

(Fdqs. l, 2,

R.2ll,
Exhs.
1-P,
14-D).
north
line
of of Museum
defendants'
lands
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding forThe
digitization
provided by
the Institute
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

begins near

~he

~ou~h

of

~hite

Pine Canyon and extends up White

Pine Canyon and over into the area of Iron Mountain (Exhs. 1-P,
14-D).

Plaintiffs'

lands are situate u?-canyon and for the most

part are bounded on the North and South by defendants' lands
(Exhs. 1-P, 14-D).
Defendants are the children and successors of John G.
Condas who acquired the lands in part patented by Delbert Redden,
in part under his own homestead patents and in part patented by
brother, Gust Condas (Exhs. 33-D, 34-D, 35-D, 11-D).

~is

Plain-

tiffs are the children and successors of Peter G. Candas who
acquired his lands under his own homestead patent (Exh. 12-D•
John G. Condas and Peter G. Condas were brothers, making defendants
and ?laintiffs first cousins.
The first homestead entry was made by Delbert Redden in
1912 covering the
o:

Wh~te

Pine

northernmos~

Can~·on

s~ead

on which the buildings and improvements were
Del~er~

located (Ex. 33-D).

lands of defendants in the mouth

H. Redden filed an additional home-

entry in 1922 covering the

adjoin~ng

Canyon and ta the East (Exh. 34-D).
entr~es
proper~:_;

land up White Pine

John G. Condas filed homestead

in 1912 and 1916 coverlng lands adjoining the Redden
(Exh.

35-D).

Gust Condas filed an adjoining homestead

entry in 1924 covering lands up-canyon and to the South and
Sast

i

Exh. 11-D).

lssued.

Patents to the above lands were thereafter

John G. Candas acquired the Redden property in 1925,

md thereafter recel':ed '1~s own t=oatents and acquired the lands
of Gust Condas, maklng

t~e

lands now owned by defendants.
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In

1926, Peter G. Candas filed his

homestea~

entry and in !929

acquired a patent to the lands now owned by plaintiffs

(Exh.

12-D).
Defendants' predecessor John G. Candas was the defendant
in an action entitled Patrick Sullivan, et ux, plaintiffs v.
John G. Candas, defendant, being Salt Lake County Civil

~o.

42140, concerning the White Pine Canyon Road as it crossed the
Sullivan property immediately to the
owned by John G. Candas.

~orth

of the lands then

Plaintiffs' predecessor, Peter G.

Candas, was not a party to the foregoing action.

A final Decree

was entered therein on December 4, 1928 (Exh. 36-D) whlch
adjudicated that a public highway existed from the Park City
Highway along Trottman's Lane and over and across Sullivan's
property to the gate (on the North line of the then John G.
Condas property) .

An appeal was taken by plaintiffs Sulllvan

to the Utah Supreme Court and its opinion is reported ln 76
585, 290 Pac. 954

~ta~

(1930) wherein the decree of the trial court

was affirmed.
One of the pivotal issues in this case was '"'hether any
portion of the Abstract of the Record (Exh. 2-P) or the 3rie:s
(Exhs. 3-P, 4-P) filed in Sullivan v. Candas, supra (Supreme
Court Case No. 4922) was admissible in evidence in this case.
Plaintiffs offered in evidence the foregoing Abstract
(R. 405) to which defendants objected

(R.~OS-409)

initially would not receive it (R.408-410).

and

a~

?eccr~

~he

Court

Therea:tec-, ::cla~:lt~:';

attempted to o~fer portions o~ the ~ore~oi~s Abst~3·:~ c~ ?ecor~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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=lece~ea:

b·

rea~~~g

paragrap~

l~

o: the Answer and Counterclaim of defendant therein,

John Candas

excE~pts

(2.411,412)

and moved to strike

t~ereof

i~to

the record comprising

to which defendants objected (R.412,413)

(R.416) which

ment by the trial court

~otion

was taken under advise-

(R.416).

Thereafter, plaintiffs were permitted to read into the
record from

Exhib~t

3-P

(~espondents'

Brief) over defendants'

obJection and subject to their :1otion to Stri:.r;:e

(R.422), portions

o: the abstracted testimony of se•1eral witnesses and/or
t~ereo:,

incl-lcing the summarized testimc!"'.f c:= John G. ConC.as,

as sur:unarized bj his law:/er
mo•;eC. to
iR-~35,

summar~es

str~i<e

'R.

423-~35.

~ncl. I .

all o: the :"oregoing testimony and summan.es

which the trial court took under
At the concl·-lsion ::J:= plai:1ti:=:=s'

adv~sement
~--i

Sull~van

case,

~ncluded

~n

t~e

~r.

Abstract of the

Exhibit 2-P;

the Answer and Countercla1m of John G. Condas,
of the testlmony o:"fered bj

(R.436).

se:--.ce, plaintiffs

reo:=:=ered int::J evidence desiqnated parts o:
Record in the

then

De:"en.::a~.::s

John Condas,

the

to-wit,

~ecree,

all

including the

findings c: the ~istr~ct C::Jurt of which a part of Finding No.
was read i:1to the record
their

Ob~ect1on

anc :1otion to Strike

overruled de:"endants'
to de:'e:1dants'

iR.6l9-622,

~otl:::n

incl.1.

8

Defendants renewed

( R. 624).

The trial court

Objection and received the evidence subject
to Str1'::e

rR.62~\.

Defe:1dants were to be af:"orded the opportun1ty to proffer
other portlons of the Abstract of Record 1n the Sullivan v. Candas
case a:=ter tne ~~wer court =~led on defenda:1ts'

~otion to Strike
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(R.622,623,624).

At the conclusion o: de:er-.C:a::ts' e':::.ce:1ce,

was again made clear that in the event the trial court ruled

·~
t~~

above proffer admissible, defendants would be afforded the
opportunity to present any additional documentation out of the
Sullivan v. Condas case which they determine necessary (R.965).
Some three and one-half months after final arguments,

t~e

lower court ruled that the abstracts of testimony in the

Sulli?~

v. Condas case and the pleadings of John Condas, and the

:inC:l~::

and Decree were admissible in this case and on that basis declde:
this case on its merits

(R.l90,19l) without affording

de:endan~3

an opportunity to proffer rebuttal portions of the above al:stnc:
as defendants had been repeatedly assured they would be

?er~1t:e:

to do ( Tr. 6 2 2 , 6 2 3 , 6 2 4 , 9 6 5 ) .
Defendants are mindful of the time-honored rules of
lic~t

appellant review which require stating the :acts in the
most favorable to the Findings of Fact and Decree below.

Howe·:e~

in view of the difficulties above enumerated and defendants'

:~r

position as to the inadmissibility of such e·ndence, de fen dan ts'
further Statement of Facts herein is developed to the exclusion
of such evidence.
In 1903, only a trail about four or five feet wide
up White Pine Canyon to the flats

(Supplemental Record -

ex1s:e~

Ja~es

Archibald Deposition, p. 8) wh1ch remained the same in 1905 or
1906 (ibid p. 10) and 1907

(ibid p. ll).

The

Trott~an

Lane usei

to connect with the road to Red Pine Canyon as it came au: of
McDonald's Basin (ibid p. 15).

From 1903 to l9l'

3

•:er::· ::oar

trail existed up the bottom of White ?1ne Ca::yon, out no road
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:or a wagon

1Suoplemental Record - Earl Johnson Deposition, pp.

8, 9, 10).

The Trottman Lane was passable by a wagon to the Del

7,

Redden cabln but not beyond (ibid p. 11).
From 1915 to 1920 only a horse trail existed which was
steep and rough with a lot of rocks

(R.438,442,443,445).

In 1908

or 1910 and in 1915 there wasn't any trail to amount to anything
IR.47l,475).
IR. 64 4)

I:-~

1922 there was no road up White Pine Canyon

•

From 1920 to 1950 only a single trail existed up White
Pine Canyon beyond the first stream crossing above the John Condas
buildings

(R.652,655,659,666,667,672,675,676,680,681,689,69l,

729,734,735,736,737,749,750,760,762,763,771,775,~84,79G,-9l,855,

856,885,904,905,912,915,916,925,931,943).

The only exceptions

were described as a trail where you could drive a car through
(?.533), or someti:ne bet·.veen 1925 and 1929, :;r.:.nts of t•,.;o tracks
showing that four-wheeled vehicles had been on the road (R.498)
or in 1342 a road or trail not: :nanrnade ·,.;ith tracks
an

u:-~improved

(R.969), or

road or jeep trall ln 1940 based on opinion

R.lJ36)

From 1903 ·_mtil 1925 no one but <:he Condases and an
occasional horseback rider was seen traveling in White Pine Canyon
(Supplemental Record - James Archibald Deposition, pp. 12,22;
Supf)lementa'.. Recor:)- Earl Johnson Depositlon, pp.

9,10;

(R.44l,

475,6"75).
Durlng the '/ears

19~5

ln interest of jefendants,

:o 1928, John G. Condas, predecessor

construc~ed

gates Wlthin the northerly pcr':ion

o~

a series of fences and

his property dividing the
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same into several pastures and corral areas which included a
wooden gate across the roadway entering his property on the
North line thereof and a series of division fences and wire
gates along the roadway through his pasture and corral areas
and a wooden gate of only sufficient width to permit passage
of a person riding horseback across the roadway near the southerl·
end of his pasture area (Fdg.9, R.213; Exh.l5-D).
The wooden gate and its replacements constructed across
the roadway on the North line of the John G. Condas property
was uaually maintained in a closed and locked condition, whenever John G. Condas and his successors were away from the
property, generally since the construction thereof until the
present time, and was generally maintained in a closed but
unlocked condition when they were present on the property and
said gates were generally posted with "keep out" or "no
trespassing" signs since the construction thereof until the
present time (Fdg.lO, R.213).
During the period from 1926 to 1932, inclusive, entry
upon and use of the roadway up White Pine Canyon across defendants' property by plaintiffs' predecessor in interest was

w~~h

the permission and consent of defendants' predecessor in lnteres:
who provided a key to the locked gate to plaintiffs' predecessor
in interest (Fdg.ll, R.213).
During the period from 1933 to 1970, inclusive, plainti::s
and/or their predecessors in interest, leased their lands to
defendants' predecessor in interest and/or defendants or t~e
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
errors.
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lands of both part1es were jointly leased to third persons and
all during said period the entry upon and use of the roadway up
White Pine Canyon across defendants' property by plaintiffs and
their predecessors in interest was with the consent and permission
of defendants and/or their predecessor in interest (Fdg.l2, R.213,
214) .
During the period from 1926 to 1970, inclusive, the use
of the roadway by plaintiff and their predecessors in interest
was under a claim of right and not in recognition of defendants'
claimed right to grant or deny permission to u.se same

(Fdg .13,

R. 214 l .

In 1972, defendants petitioned the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County to vacate a portion of the roadway
across the northerly portion of their
existed

1Fdg.l7,

'Tacated by

_f such public road

R.214), and that portion of :he roadway was

Ordi:-~ance

63 dated September 6, 1972

3.mended on Februar:_; 7, 1973
sioners did not

ia~~s

gi~e

(Exh. 38-D).

(Exh. 39-D) as

The Board of Commis-

notice of the vacation to the plaintiffs

nor did they (it) publish notice of the vacation prior to
enacting the vacating ordinance (Fdg.lB, R.2141.

Notice of

the enactment of Ordinance 63 was published in the Park Record
on September 14, 1972

I:Sxh. 40-D).
""-RGUMECJT
I:-~troduction

We are

rnlnd~ul

:~at

under tradltional rules of appellant

re·:tew t~e F1~d1~~5 ~~ ~~e ~ri~l cour~ are indulged with a
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presumption of correctness and the burden is

~pon

the attackee

to demonstrate that they are in error and should be overturned.
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Wright,
(1974).

(Utah)

(1972); First

521 P.2d 563

Here the Findings of the trial court are not only

unsupported by competent evidence, but are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

thoroug~

To establish a public

fare, plaintiffs have the burden of proving public user for 10
years by clear and convincing evidence.

Petersen v. Combe,

20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968); Thomson
Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639

(1972).

v. Condas, 27

And for a matter to be clear

and convincing it must at least have reached the point '-"here
there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion.
P.2d 194
454

Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212

(1949); Jardine v. l-.rchibald,

3 Utah 2d 88,

279 P.2d

(1955).
We are also mindful that different rules of appellant

review apply depending upon whether the case is one of law
rather than equity.

The instant action seeks injuncti'le relie:'

against interference with an alleged easement and the trial
court invoked collateral estoppel, an equitable remedy, in
granting the injunctive relief.

And where

do~bt

exists as to

whether a cause should be one in equity or one in law,
court should have some latitude of discretion.

~he

tria:

'1.

Hap?~

Sweene:

Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126

(l:J661.

an equity case, and having been so treateC.

b,·

t'le

~r:a:
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SC''Jct.

concludes

tha~

Decislon.

t~e

evidence clearly preponderates against the

Constitution of Utah, Art.

VIII, Sec.

U.R.C.P.;

Stanley''· Stanley,

Foster v.

Blake Heights Corp., (Utah) 530 P.2d 815

City v.

Lambert,
~he

key

(Utah)

issue on

97 Utah 520,

574 P.2d 727
t~ls

94 P.2d 465

(1939);

(1974); Provo

(1978).

appeal is whether the Abstract

of Record in Sullivan v. Candas
and Appellants'

9; Rule 72(a),

(Supreme Court Case No.

Brief and Respondents'

admlSSlble as evidence ln this case.

4492),

Brief filed therein are
Inherent in that issue

are
( l)

w~ether

defendants'
a~ainst

~:'1e

pleadings and abstracted testimon:: of

predecessor, John G. Candas, are declarations

interes~

~h~ch

ca~

be invoked

a~ai~s~

~~fendants

in

th_;_s case, and
whet~er

\2)

the Findings in this case can rest on

abstracted test_;_mony

o:

Wltnesses

w~o

testified in the Sullivan

case, anc
whether

1J:
or can be

l~,,oke1

~he

~octrine

aga~~st

of Collateral Estoppel applies

je~endants

i~

.:>,bsent the X::::stract of Record in
there 1s no

s~..:bstantial

thls case .
S~..:lll?an

.,. Condas,

evldence to support the findings of the

tr1al court that a publ1c road had been

estab~ished

in White

Pi:1e Can:;or..
ln

tn1s case ~stabllshes that from at least 1903 until 1950 only

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology- Act,_j_
administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

crossing just above defendants' buildings.

Llkewise

~~e

e~1jen:~

overwhelmingly establishes that during the whole of such ?ericd
the only means of travel up White Pine Canyon was by foot or
by horseback and it was not until 1950 and 1951 when a bulldozer cut a makeshift roadway up White Pine Canyon which made
it passable for even 4-wheel drive vehicles.
The sum and substance of it all is that the trial court
disregarded the evidence in this case and found against defendants because it regarded the position taken by defendants ln

~~is

case as being opposite to the position taken by their predecesso:
in Sullivan v. Candas.

In so doing the trial court erroneously

admitted into evidence the Abstract of the Record in Sulli•1an
v. Candas and the briefs filed therein, misconstrued the Findincs
of Fact therein and misapplied the Doctrine of Collateral
Estoppel herein.

The trial court then decided the case agalnst

the defendants without affording them the reassured
to proffer rebuttal portions of the abstract.

oppor~~n~~!

The end result

of it all is that the trial court opened defendants'

lands to

the public by subjecting the same to a public ::::oadway whlch ne·;e:
existed across their lands in fact or in law and in so doing
committed reversible error.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTI:JG THE .:,.BSTP_;cT JF
RECORD I:l SULLIVAN V. COC'WAS

I SUPRE~E

4922) AND THE BRIEFS FILED THEREI~

,:._s

C'JGRT c.;s;:: ·;r;.
E'!IDE:lCE :!:'1

THIS CASE.
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:e~e~~an~s·

9~edecessor

in Sulll"Ja:1 '/, Condas

~ohn

G. Candas was defendant

(Sal<: Laf::e County Civil )lo. 42140) and

neither plai:1ti:fs nor their predecessor in interest was a
t:Jarty therei:1.

Sullivans owned the land immediately North and

adjoining the land of Joh:1 G. Condas.
~an

A roadway known as Trott-

Lane extended froD the main highway across the lands of

Sulli"Jans and onto <:he land of John G. Candas.
s~ed

Candas

fo~

trespass and by

wa~

c~

~he

~

Ans~er

There Sullivans
a~d

Co·~n~erclalm

tr1al ccurt he:d that

?Ublic roadway existed across Sulli"Jans' land up to the gate
':'he tr1.al court

across <:e:e:1da:1": .:o;;..=:as'

?esponde~:.

Joh~

3.

Condas

'/:car1ous -~C-rn~.:;s1o::.s
~.::.ca:-lous

la:1.is.

~.ga;

~n

a:i;;~lss:.ons

:"\

v. Candas

Je:e:--l.::an':s 1n t:'1l3

:13'::

'-'.

employ~ent,

s,~ll~~an

3.:-e

. .:..

cc:~t:-:-l:ec

and 3.re

Cons~itutes
.~ction.

6\· ?·Jle 63 ,91,
1

:1m~ted

to agency,

conspirator or =hird-person contractual l1.ability

relatior.s:--.::.;:;s, e10:1e CJf ·,.;:C1ch a:-e ;:;rese!1t 1n this case.

The

:')rego~:~c;

of

r·-..::e

·~w·as

o:.a~2;1

:r::~

~ule

631 9), 'Jni:or:n

~ules

Conference of Commissioners

.::vne:-1::-aC~

La,..-

IC~stitute),

Rule 508.
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us~all;

Declarations of predecessors in interest, whlle
treated as vicarious admissions, are excluded from

~odel

Code
~odel

Rule 508 (Rule 63(9), U.R.E.) but may be included in the
Code Rule 509 (Rule 63(10), U.R.E.).

American Law Institute,

Model Code of Evidence, Rule 509, p. 251.

The Model Code omits

any provision for admitting declarations of predecessors in
interest except under the Code's liberal rules admitting declarations against interest.

McCormick on Evidence, Section 245,

p. 523.
Wigmore acknowledges that the Morgan Theory of Vicarious
Admissions

(adopted by the Model Code and Uniform Rules of

Evidence), has sought to overthrow the whole theory of vicario'JS
admissions as set forth in Wigmore's Treatise.
Evidence, Section 1080(a), p. 195.

Wigmore on

The rationale for the

Morgan theory is that the reception of so-called admissions
made by persons related to the now opponent only by a

"pri~ity

of interest", is a transfer into evidence law of numerous

~ests

of substantive law which have nothing to do Wlth evidential
values and that in result, the rules of e•1ide:1ce adrr,it copiousl::,
as "vicarious admissions", many sorts of extra judic:ial

s~atemen<::o

of third persons which have all the testimonial weaknesses
struck at by the hearsay rule, and which thus :'orm an anomal:JUS
and undesirable sort of evidence.

Wigmore on E•:ldence, supra.

In ruling on defendants' Objection and

~otlon

to Stri%e,

the trial court held that the allegations or assertions of
fact contained in the pleadings

!Answer and Counterc:lalm of
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Jonn G. CondasJ

~s

the~

pert~~n

to White Pine Canyon, are

3.dmissible as ''admissions" against interest

(as to this

proceeding), made by an authorized agent of defendants'
predecessor

in

title, John Candas

(R.l90).

The problem with

that is the trial court overlooked the distinction between a
declaration and an admission.

A "declaration" is the asser-

tion or a statement of fact and an "admission" is a voluntary
acknowledgement
:acts.

cer-tai:~

~n

adm~sslon

is

by a party of the existence or truth of

~ade

29 .\re1. Jur. 2d, E?idence, §597, p. 651.
~

Thus,

position taken by an adversarj, either per-

sonally or through an authorized agent, which is contrary to
and inconsistent with the contention now being made by him
the litlgation.
The
Sulli·;~:;

Jsed agal:;st
U.R.E.,

Ibid. p. 652.

ple~dings

?.

Cond~s
hi~

~~

of Jchn G. Candas made by his attorney in

~lght

~n

·..Jell 2e admissions

·.,·h~c",

c:Juld be

subsequent litigation under Rule 63(9),
However, such would not

since he authorized the same.

be admissible as against these defendants in this case under
?ule 63(91,
Lnterest

~re

C:.R.::::.,

s~:;ce

excluded

~rom

declarations of predecessors in
that rule under the

autnor~tleS

cited

above.
The pr1or

testLmon~

aga1nst hir<1 i:1 s·Jbsequent
if it

c0nsti~utes

pr~or

dec:'lrat~ons,

o~

John G. Candas would be admissible

l~tigat~on

.mder ?ule 63 ilO), U.R.E.,

a declar3tl8n against

·...•ou]....j be 3.·~"7\.!.SS:..:::·le

i:1.terest.

Likewise, his

if against his interest at the time made,
3c;ai:1s': Ce:endan~S in this ?roceeding under
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the general rule cited by this Court in Lyman Grazlng Assoc.
Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905

(1970).

Ho·..,ever, to be

admissible here under Rule 63(10), U.R.E., such declaratlons
must be statements of fact made by John G. Candas

hi~self

against his interest at the time made.
(2) Neither the Pleadings, Testimony or Brief of
Respondent, John G. Candas, in Sullivan v. Candas are Admissible
as Declarations Against Interest.
The exception to the hearsay rule of declarations
against interest are covered by Rule 63(10), U.R.E., which
requires that such statement be made by the declarant and be
against the interest of the declarant when made.

Rule 63 (10),

U.R.E., was taken from Rule 63(10), Uniform Rules of Evidence,
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifor7
State Laws in 1953, which notes that this exception, as does
Model Code Rule 509, changes the prevailing rules by making
declarations against interest admissible even though the
declarant is available as a witness, and by recogn2zing the
value of declarations against a social, as well as his pecuniac
or proprietary interest.
Under Model Code Rule 509, the facts staced must be
contrarJ to the interest of the declarant at the time of the
statement, and evidence of the declaration is admisslble '"herever relevant, no matter against whom it is offered.

.;mer lean

Law Instit'-.lte, Model Code of E•1idence, Rule 309, p. 236.

:-low-

ever, as noted above, such declarations must be 3n 3ssert10n
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o~

a statement of

~act

~ade

by the declarant himself.

Thus,

neither the ?lead1ngs or brief of res?ondent John G. Condas in
Sullivan v. Condas are admissible as declarations against
interest in this case under Rule 63(10), U.R.E.
The only declarations which might qualify under Rule

63(10), U.R.E., are the statements of John G. Condas in his
testimony in Sullivan v. Condas.

A careful reading of the

abstracted 90rtion of his testimony
194,

195)

rExh.

2-P, pp. 104-111, incl.,

reveals no statement ::Jr declaration by him of a

public roadway '.l? "tJhi te ?ine Canyon tl'lrough his prooerty.

The

most that can be said about it is his abstracted st.atement or.
page 111 thereof that
"~; corrals and sheds do not shut off what
might o~her~ise be a trail or a road up t~e
canyon.
I have a trail outside of my ccrrals.
~~en t~ey =orne ~p ~l~~ sheep ~~ey have ~c ;o
arounc."

~oth1ng

conta1ned there1n constitutes a declaration against

lnterest

~ithin

t~e

mean1ng and definition of Rule 63(10),

Accordlngl;, even the abstracted testimony of John G.

:_~.~.E.

Condas in Sulll"lan v.

Condas is i."ladmissible as

evidence in this

case.
(3) The .::..bstrac': o: Record in Sullivan''· Condas Does
~ot

Come Within the Hearsay Exception of Content of Official

?,eco!:"d

._·:--.der

1

Hul2

63 ':._

-:~,

C.~.E.

"O:'f1c1al ?ecord" 1s de:'1ned 1n R'.lle 68 (4), U.R.E.,
and means all out~:c ·o~c-lti:->CTS,

incl•.ldl:1S laws,

judicial records,
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Rule 63(17), U.R.E.,

is an exception to the

~earsa;

to prove the content of an official record.

rule onl;

In Bridges v.

Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 738

Union

(1971),

this Court noted that the explanatory note under Rule 63(15),
U.R.E.,

states:
. It is not designed to permit the admission
of a judgment or finding of fact of a court or administrative body for the purpose of proving the matters
upon which such judgment or finding of fact were baseC.."

The foregoing is equally applicable here and the Abstract

o~

Record in Sullivan v. Candas is not admissible under Rule 63117!,
U.R.E.
(4) Abstracted Portions of Selected Testimony From the
Abstract of Record in Sullivan v. Candas Do Not Come Withln
the Hearsay Exception of Depositions and Prior Testimony Cnder
Rule 63 (3), U.R.E.
Testimony given at a former trial or proceedi:1g bet·.veer:
the parties to an action or proceeding is hearsay, and

~nless

a proper foundation is laid to bring S•.1ch testimony •.vi thin the
exception to the hearsay rule,
29 Am. Jur.

2d, Evidence,

it is not admissible in e·1idence.

§738, pp.

807,

808.

The trial court

held that the abstracts of testimony in the Sulli'lan v. Candas
case is material and relevant and meets the requireme:1ts of
Rule 63(3)(b)(i) and (ii), U.R.E.,
Rule 63(3), U.R.E.,

(R.l90).

requires that prior testimon:.:

admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule is sub~ect to
the same limitations and objections as tho~gh t~e dec:~ra:1~
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It requires a finding that the
declarant is

una~ailable

as a witness and no evidence was

offered by plaintiffs to establish such fact as to any declarant except defendants'

predecessor John G. Candas.

In order to prove testimony given at a former trial,
it must also appear that there is substantial identity of
9arties and issues.
Annotation:

29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence,

70 A.L.R.

defendant in the

fo~er

2d 494.

5743, p. 812;

John G. Candas was the

case of Sullivan v. Candas, but

neither plaintiffs nor their predecessor in lnterest was a
9arty thereto.

~or

the Sullivans.

The iss'.le in t!1e former trial was whether a

are plaintiffs successors in lnterest c0

?Ubllc roadway existed across the Sullivan property and not
~hether

a public roadway exlsted across
Thus,

th~

;;h~

~.

Candas

there lS no S'.lbstantial identity of parties

and lSSues to satisfy the req'.llsites for admissibility of
such hearsay evidence.
The form of t:"te foe1er

testlmon:~

:nay be by oral testimony

of other •,;itnesses ·,;he hear::l and remember the former testimony
or by a

~erified

copy of the transcript, stenographic notes

or by notes made by a witness which correctly and accurately
and full:/ reproduce the former testimony.
E'lidence,

:)76:],

-;"61,

76-l,

-6:0;

.~nnotacion:

29 .=\In. Jur 2d,
11

.~.L.R.

2d 30.

The whole S'-!bsta:1ce of :::-:e ·...-hole of the for:-:ter ·,;itness'

testi-

mony, or at least the substance of the whole testimony on the
~articular

~oint

or :ss~e :nvo!ved in the previous trial, must

oe ~~c·:e~~,

1~cl~~:~·~ jo~~

~~s::~on·

~1ven on t~e direct examin-
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ation and testimony given on the cross-examination, a::. <:!-.ough '.::--.e:
identical words need not be reproduced.

Annotation:

ll .i\.L.E.

2d 30, §32, p. 112; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence, §762, p. 832.
Here the prior testimony is not in the form of an official
transcript nor the testimony of a witness who was present at
the Sullivan v. Condas trial.

Rather, it is in the form of an

abstract of selected portions and/or summarized statements of
prior testimony.

Accordingly, the abstracted testimony in the

form offered is inadmissible in this case against these defendants.

Furthermore, a litigant is not at all bound by the

testimony given by his witnesses on a former trial of the same
case; that is to say, the former testimony does not, on the
latter trial, constitute evidence of the true facts in regard
to which the inquiries were made.
521, 522.

Annotation:

74 A.L.R. 2d

For the trial court to base its findings in this case

on selected extracts and/or summarized statements of

testu"on~·

given in Sullivan v. Condas is reversible error.
(5) The Trial Court Erred in Taking Judicial

~ot~ce

the Findings of Fact and Decree in Sullivan v. Condas and

of
~n

Admitting the Same in Evidence from the Abstract of Record
Therein.
The trial court concluded that the

Find~ngs

of Fact and

Decree in the Sullivan case constitute a public record of
judicial proceedings of which the court may take

~ud~c~al

notlce

or receive under other rules qualifying same for introdJCtlon
into the evide:1ce in this case

(R.l91J.
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s~~li~an

Co~das

v.

~ere

.c,bstract of Record

of~ered

(Exh.

by plaintiffs as a part of the

2-P, p!=J.

36-43, incl.; R.405,619-622,

The Decree was offered by plaintiffs as a part of the

incl. l .

same Abstract of Record
622, incl. l.

(Exh. 2-P, pp. 45-49, incl.; R.405,619-

Plaintiffs did not offer certified copies from

the District Court files.

A certified copy of the Decree was

separately offered by defendants and was received (Exh. 36-D;
?.. 962,963).

The

r~le

applicable

~o

Judicial proceedlngs is that,

while a court may take JUdicial notice of the proceedings and
records ln the case

be~ore

it, the court cannct ln one

take judicial notice of its own records in another and
?obison v.

case.

Spencer •;.
( 19 3 3 i .

Kelly,

69 Utah 376,

Industrial Commission, 81

:-lore

recen~ly

~his

Cour'::.

in the Interest ·of Hales, r:.:tah)

255 Pac. 430
C~a:-,

sta~ed

ell,

c~se
dlf~erent

(1927);

2J P.2d 618

the rule in State,

538 P.2d 1034

11975), as

follows:
"In anv case ~he court should not take notice
sua sDonte ; : the Droceedinqs in another case unless
the files of the other case-are placed in evidence
in the

mat~er

be~~re

the court."

To the same effect is Carter·:. Carter,
!1977).

~or

·.Utah)

563 P.2d 177

can this court Judicially notice proceedings and
Johanson v. Cudahv

Packi~g

lH,

152 P.:d 98

( 194 .j)

•

0n:y the ~ecree 1n Su!li~an v. Ccndas decided any of
All that ~ecree dec1des relevant here is
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that a public highway exists from the main State highwa: and
running along Trottman's Lane, Southerly toward White Plne
Canyon and over Sullivans' land to the gate on the South
boundary of the Sullivan property.

The Decree is clear and

unambiguous.
An ambiguous Judgment

(or Decree)

is subject to the same

construction according to the rules that apply to all written
instruments.

Moon Lake %'ater Users Association v. Hanson,

535 P.2d 1262 (1975).

Where

(uta~.

(as here) a judgment lS clear anc

unambiguous, neither pleadings, findings of fact nor a verdict
may be resorted to change its meaning.

Chronister v. State Fau.

Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,

(1963); Callan v. Callac.,

(Wash.) 468 P.2d 456

(N.M.) 381 P.2d 673
(1970).

If a judgment is not amblguous

and leaves nothing for interpretation, there is no need to re:e:
to the pleadings or other parts of the Record.

46 .:>.m. Jur. 2c,

Judgments, §76, p. 365.
The trial court committed error ln taking Judicial not::e
of the Findings of Fact in Sullivan v. Condas and in admittln=
the same in evidence in the form of the Abstract of Record.

':'~.e

trial court committed reversible error in making and entering
its Findings of Fact 6 and 7 based thereon and in foundina ltS
Decree on such findings.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO THE F.'\CTS OF
THIS CASE.
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ihe

~hole

thlS case is
(R.l9l)

basis for the

su~ed

~rial

court's decision in

up in its Oecision dated August 2, 1977,

as follows:
"Based upon the principle of collateral estoppel,
this Court concludes that the plaintiffs' (Defendants')
predecessor having succeeded in prior litigation on
his clai~ that a public road existed uc White Pine
Canyon, his successors in interest can~ot now turn
from that benefit established in a court of law to
take an opposite position to gain another benefit
at t:Hs ~ime.
!Richards?. Hodson, 26 U. 2d 113,
:-:ec:-.an ·:.City of Cle:1dale, -i89 P.2d 65.)"

:et 1:1 ?:.c:-,ards .,.
a:1d cited bj

~he

C!odson,

Repcr~s.

485 P.2d 1044

119"71),

tr1al court, this Court held that col:ateral

a party in a prior action.
~tah

26 '.:tah 2d,

~hus

on pages 115 and 116 cf the

this Court clearly stated the applicat1on of the

:cctrine of Collateral Estoppel 1n

~ta-

as :c:lows:

";.. :or:n o: res j'J.Ci.:ata a7!=:.ies ~o situations
like th:.s wherein :.ssues ~hich are actually decided
aca:.r.st a party in a prior action may be relied
upcn cy an opponent in a later case as having been
j'..;clclal2.y established.
i!"lis doctrine, known as
colla.:.er-~1 es~o~~e~, di::ers :!:":::m r-es judlcata not
o:1ly in the fact that all part:.es need not be the
sa~e i:1 the two actions, but also in t!"le fact that
t!"le es~oppel acclies onl"l to issues actually
lit1ga~ed and ; ; t ~o tho~e which cculd ha"le been
C.e<:e::-;.:ir.ed."
Sull:.?an v.
~rem

the

~a:.:-1

Candas decided that a public roadway existed

h:.~hway

along

~rctcman's

Lane Southerly towards

Jecr-ee

~as

lt decided
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then lands of John G. Condas.

Nor was any issue decided agaLns:

him therein unless it could be said that the refusal or faLlure
of che District Court to hold that a public roadway existed up
White Pine Canyon constituted a decision that no public road
existed above his north line.
The trial court invoked collateral estoppel in this
case on the authority of the Utah case of Richards v. Hodson,
supra, and the Arizona case of Mecham v. Citv of Glendale,
supra.

Yet in Richards, supra, this Court held that defendants

were collaterally estopped from asserting the invalidity of
the sale since that issue tEa been decided against them in the
prior litigation.

However, in Mecham supra, the Arizona

Intermediate Court of Appeals held that Mechams were "Judl.ciall/'
estopped from assuming a contrary position to that asserted by
them in the prior litigation.
Here the trial court was bound to follow the

applica~~o~

of collateral estoppel as announced by this Court 1.n Richards,
supra.

There this Court emphasized that the issue had to be

actually decided against a party in a prior action and would
not apply to issues which could have been determined.

The

issue of whether a public road existed up White Pine Canyon over
and beyond the lands of John G. Candas coulcl ha·1e t::ee:-. deci:ied
in Sullivan v. Candas, but was not decided aca1.nst

hL~.

Even if the Findings of Fact in Sullivan v. Condas
could be referred to herein, a careful readino

thereo~

that there is no finding ·.vh1.ch spec1.ficall:.: f;_!1ds a

re~eals

::1b~lC
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roadway U?
John G.

~h1te

?.:._ne Canyon aver and beyond the then lands of

Candas.

are either

All references to the public

o~er

road~ay

therein

and across the lands of Sullivan or from the

Park City highway and passes over and along Trottman's Lane and
onto and across the lands of Sullivan with the center line
specifically described to the gate on his south boundary.
Likewise the Decree therein describes the public highway as
running over and along Trottman's Lane southerly towards White
Pine Canyon and not up '.'lh1te Pine Canyon.
It 1s interesting to note that Finding
IR.212),

superimposes over defendants'

1dentical language of Finding

~o.

8 in Sull1van

Finding :-lo.

6 herein

Sulli•Jan ,.

Candas found that the road'Aia::

d~d

~-

the
~h1ch

Candas

\'/hat is more,

finds t:'lat the Distr1ct Court in
_:: :;"h.:._te Pine Canyon

nad been used by the general publ1c s1nce 1873.
those find1ngs

4 herein

lands herein,

'AlaS ther-e lim1ted to the lands of Sullivan.
(R.2l2),

~o.

~owhere

in

the District Court find that the general

;>ublic had used t;'le roadway up •.vh::..te P1ne Canyon or abo·Je t!:le
south boundary of

Sull1~an's

Likewise, nowhere in those

land.

findings did the District Court find a publ1c use dating back
to the year 1873.
The tr1al

judge in Sull1van

~-

Candas

~ho

heard all of

the test1mony of all of the 'Aiitnesses :J.nd knew the area made
no find1ngs

that a public road existed up White Pine Canyon

beyond the south boundary of the Sullivan lands.
·,;as

·:er~·

Likewise, he

careful .:._n :11s Decree to limit the public road to
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Trottman's Lane from the Park City Highway southerly towards
White Pine Canyon and specifically termlnated it at the gate
on the south boundary of the Sullivan property.

To permit the

lower court in this case to second guess that trial judge some
49 years later based on incomplete and inadmissible hearsay
evidence would do violence to the law and would undermine the
rules of evidence.
The sum and substance of it all is that the lower court
misconstrued the findings in Sullivan v. Candas e•1en if it
could refer to them, misapplied the application of the Doctrine
of Collateral Estoppel as announced by this Court in Richards •:.
Hodson, supra, and in so doing committed serious and reversible
error.
POINT III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE ROADWAY CP
WHITE PINE CA.:.\lYON OVER DEFENDANTS' LA:iDS IS

-~

PL'BLIC

ROAD IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
The most discouraging part of this 'tJhole case 1.s t!1at
the trial court in its zeal to implement its erroneous application of the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel superimposed on
defendants' lands selected abstracted testimon:; frCJm Sulli·:an
v. Candas as it related to the roadway or trall 'ell=' '.Vhite P1:1e
Canyon.

The net effect thereof was to retry Sull::.·Jan

'f.

Candas

based on a cold, condensed, inadmissible .~bstract of the !".ecor::
without the benefit of viewing the exhibits or hear::.nc

a::
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of

t::e ·..;l. :r-.es.ses.

pre~ecess2r

~~

~~:eres:

~s

~~lte

a

~iffere~t

thing from binding

i.;:.

=~
=~a~wa:

l~S

~=

?~~d~~c

~~i~e

~o.

3, the trial court found that the

Can:on

?~~e

a public road and has been

~s

1?..212

~:--.:.eres:.

5 that the
~ses

-a~e

~-

:.~e

r=a~~3·.·

~ere

~n

~oct,

ty hcrseback, in horse-

?.2121

?e<:e:-s,-:r. ·:.

:::..1:~,

.;s sue!"!

.:;...:.c:r3· :-:--.o:-:-.sor:. '/,

... .

' '

~

,

~-...:..

:-~·:erse

is clear t!'lat sue!"!

3nd convincing evidence.
:2~~l~c~··

.......:::-

·

....-

-.

--

and iccumentar:· evidence,
:~

Sul:~~an

7.

Candas,
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T!'le

clearly demonstrate that such findings are not only unsupported
by the evidence but are contrary to the

overwhel~lng

we1ght of

the evidence.
At the outset it should be noted that there could be no
use by either plaintiffs' or defendants' predecessors in
interest prior to 1924 since neither was there prior to that
time (R.SOO).

The very earliest in time testified to by any

witness in this case was James Archibald whose testimony was
offered by plaintiffs in the form of his deposition

IR.478-~31,

incl.; Supplemental Record- James Archibald Deposition).
first time the witness Archibald was in

~hite

The

Pine Canyon was

1898 in the wintertime assisting his father in bringing out logs
on a bobsled (ibid. pp. 5,6).

The next time he was in White

Pine Canyon was in 1903 when he "walked on, oh, k1nd of a road.
It really wasn't a road,
(ibid. p.S).

it was a trail

about~

or 5 feet w1de.

He was there again in 1905 or 1906 on horseback

(ibid. p.lO), and 1907 on horseback

(ibid. p.ll), and never

observed a wagon beyond the Sullivan property
saw no one else on foot or horseback

llbL:!.

p.91, 2.:1d

(ibid. pp. 12, 22), but

did observe livestock in White Pine Canyon

liblj.

?.22)

The next witness in point of time who testified in ttis
case was Earl Johnson whose testimony was o:fered by p:a1:1t1ffs
in the form of his deposition

i R. 4 78-481,

Record - Earl Johnson Depositlon).

incl.; S'_:pp:!_eme!'ltal

He was flrst tjere whe!'l :1e

was 12 years old, ie. 1903, and traveled up

~h1te

several times a month by saddle horse ever:; year

P~:1e
_mt~l

Ca:1yon
;_jl_7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

28 -

r1tic. 9 p.

3,7,8).

In 1903 "there was a '.fery poor trail but

no sign of any wagon, no road for a '-'agon," which condition
s~ayec

pretty much the same every year from 1903 until 1917

(ibid. p.B).

During that entire period he never saw anyone

else in the canyon nor did he ever see a wagon or other vehicle
up \-lhite Pine Canyon beyond the Del Redden cabin and White Pine
Canyon was not passable by a wagon
~i~e

~here

was a

~cor

(ibid.

see any logg1ng any
~he

tn1s case,

Wl~ness,
tes~1f1ed

At that

road on which a wagon could travel up to

::::el ?eCC.er. :::abi:1, but not beyond
~~d

pp. 9,10).

~ime

~hite

out of

Gilbert Kimball,
tha~

(ibid. p.ll).

He never

Pine Canyon

(ibid. p.l6).

called by plaintiffs in

between 1915 and 1320 he

tra~e:ed

a:1d cown •.-ihite Pi:1e Ca:1yon six or seven times on horseback
4~4)

up
(R.438,

cur1ng which period he never saw anyone but sheep men

iCondases)

tra·;eli:Jg up

~he

at that time was a trail
·,nth a lot of rocks

cani·on

.~.::.1

that existed

(R.442,445), which was steep and rough

(R.445).

He rode single file because the

;:::ail ·was not sufficiently wide
sice by side

:R.~~::.

~o

permit t·wo persons to ride

(R.443,445).

The witness, Douglas C. Archlbald, called by plaintiffs
1n this case,

testified that the first time he was in White

P1ne Canyon was when he was 12 or 14

(1908-1910)

at which time

':'"lere 'wasn't an:.; trail or ::oad to a:71our.t to anything

(R.471),

wn1ch he ~ua!lfled by sta~ing that "there wasn't any speclfic
You

':rall.
·~a·.!

'J?

t:;ere''

·::::.~-5).

JUS~

~ook

the easiest

He went up the canyon again in 1915
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and didn't see anyone else up there on elther occaslon

1?.~75:.

Thus, plaintiffs' own evidence as shown by the testimon:
of their own witnesses in this case is wholly contrary to
Findings 3, 4 and 5.

Furthermore, the documentary evidence

offered by defendants in this case and the testimony of
practically all of the witnesses called by defendants, are
contrary thereto.
Exhibit 16-D is a geologic

~ap

dated 1901 and shows

the roadways to the upper White Pine Canyon area from the
Thaynes Canyon side and shows only a trail
White Pine Canyon

(dashed-line) down

(R.739,740).

Exhibit 31-D is a copy of the original c. S. Government
Land Office survey map of Township 2 South, Range 3 East,
S.L.B.& 11., dated September 17, 1903, and incl,.Jdes a
photocopy of the area in question.
the

NE~

NE~

~ore

legi:;:~

It shows a roadway enterinc

of Sec. l in the upper right hand corner coursing

Southeasterly and terminating just below the !.'lgure "56.35"
which terminus corresponds •.Yith a point j'.JS':: South of the Candas
cabin as shown on Exhibits 1-P and 14-D.

1?.956,957,959,961).

Exhibit 32-D comprises the original sur·1ey notes 'Jf: ::he
Government surveyor in 1901 and 1902 from which Exhibit
was prepared (R.959,96l).

31-~

The survey notes show '::he roadwaj

crossing the east line of Section l, 19.0 change

~or'::h

o:

the W\ corner thereof, designated as "road to Can~n bears E and
W."

( Exh . 3 2 - D, p . 3 0 8 ) .

However, the survey notes 1o not

a roadway crossing the south line of Section 1

E;-ch,.

sho~

32-:;, ::o.2So
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nor a roadwa; crossing
p.253)

~or

~he

south line

a roadwa; crossing the

32-D, p.253)

o~

~ast

Section 12

(Exh. 32-D,

line of Section 13

(Exh.

all of which are now crossed by the existing White

Plne Canyon Road (Exh. 14-D).

Yet the survey notes show other

roadways which cross the section lines, viz. the north line of
Section 1

(Exh.

32-D, p. 308)

being :Jorth of the subject proper-

tles 3nd on the south line of Section 24

(Exh. 32-D, p.305),

belng South of the subject pro;:>erties on the
Exhibits 16-D,
;:>repared by ;_::>ublic

31-D and 32-D 3re

of~icials.

\~est

ancien~

:'1onitor Flats.

public documents

The very clear inference there-

from is that in 1901 3.11d 1902, no roaci·..;a:: existed u;:> 'ilhlte Pine
Otherwlse the same would have been shown on tne

Canyon.

geologic map,

the official Go•;ernment Land

and would have been identlfled in

t~e

0f~ice

survey map

official notes of the

Equally signlflcant are the patent documents covering
the Gust Candas ;:>atent (Exh. 11-D), and
patent

(Exh.

road passes
contair:s a
July 21,

o:

way ...

'il1tness,

A~J

Peter G. Candas

12-D), over which the ;:>resent White ?ine Canyon
(R.S34,536).

certl~icate

The second page of Exhibit 11-D

!Jy the Government staLlS clerk dated

1931, of the word "none" following the word "rights
Li~ewise

en the second ;_::>age of the Testimony of

Peter G. Candas, plaintiffs'

December 30,
?JE

~he

Sec.

LJJ•),

predecessor, dated

shows "1925, cut trails on Sees. 12, 13 T2S,

:a, T2S,

R~E.

these

~rails

belng necessary to get

When asked about it the wltness, Peter G. Candas,
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~orego:~o

acknowledged that he probably made the
(R. 5 38) .

s:ate~e~t
coverl~G

Likewise, the second page of Exhibit 12-D

the Peter G. Candas patent contains a certificate by the
Government status clerk dated January 27, 1930, of the •..;ord
When asked about

"none" following the words "rights of way".

9urea~

it the witness, Peter G. Candas, denied so advising the
of Land Management

(R.535).

The same status clerk

is contained in each of the Delbert H.

Redde~

33-D, 34-D) and the John G. Candas patent
The more current documentar:;

certi:icat::~.

pate~ts

(Exh.

Ex~.

35-J).

comprlSln::

e•Jide~ce

t~e

general highway maps show that since at least 1937 only that
portion of the White Pine Canyon road extending

~rom

the

~aln

state highwa:; to a point near the center line o: Section 1
the old Candas cabin)

road system (Exh. 19-D, R.865).
(Exh. 20-0,

R.866),

in 1966

22-D, R.869), and in 1975
recent maps

;:ar~

has been designated as
The same was

!Exh.

(Exh.

21-D,

23-D,

o: t.le

tr~e

C'J:.Jr:':··

ln 1350

R868•

R.8"70).

(Exh. 1-P, 14-DI, show the roadway

lines) terminating at the old Candas cab in nea :- t:'le :::ere :e :Section 1 and be:;ond only as a traLl

:J :'

!single-dashed 1Lnel.

The witnesses, called J.efendants in thls case, pre>•::de a.:-1
unbroken chain of credible evidence of no
user from 1922 until the present
ignored.

ti~e

The witness, Cleo Wri:ht,

in the area from 1922

unt~l

1926 or

go up White Pine CanJOn because

pub~ic

whLc~

read :r

Sl~P~!

tes:i:Led

t~a:

:a~~c:

:e

~e

5ne~~

~an

~327

t:-,e~e

·..;as no

c~b1l:

~oa.:
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he hired a D-8 caterpillar which made a passable road for a
4-wheel drive vehicle (R.692).

The road was repaired in 1972

and 1974 (R.696) and by "the movie people" in 1975 (R.697).
The witness, James Ivers, Jr., testified that in 1928
there was a narrow trail down White Pine Canyon
was the same in 1929 (R.729).

(R.727) which

In 1930 the trail was narrow,

rocky in places, was impassable by a wagon

(R.734) and was

no more than what a horse could travel which would be about
18 inches or 24 inches wide

(R.735,736).

From 1930

~ntil

1941 he traveled the canyon on horseback approximately 15 times
each year (R.731,735), and the trail did not change during the
entire period (R.735) nor did he recall any change in the
conditions from 1945 to 1950 (R. 737).

He '.Vould occasionally

run into sheepherders but never saw a sheep wagon along t:-te
trail (R. 728,729,736).
The witness, Andrew Louras, who was a

ca~p

tender for

John G. Candas during the year 1932 and 1933, or 1933 and
1934 (R.747,748) traveled the canyon on horseback at least
once a week (R.749), testified that during those years just
a trail existed up White Pine Canyon

iR.749) ·.vhlch was only

wide enough to get one horse through (R.750)
The witness, David R. Spafford, who was camp tender for
John Candas from 1929, 1930 and 1931 (R.768) who traveled the
canyon at least a dozen times each summer (R.770J oy saC.dle
horse (R.77l), testified that it was very steep and very narrow
and heavily wooded and there was only one track where you ~ad
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to go s1ngle rile

(R./71) and when he returned in 1945 it was

just a regular horse trail as it had always been (R.775).

He

never saw a wagon or a vehicle along the White Pine Canyon
trail above the creek crossing (R.771) but encountered a rider
once in a while (R.772).
The witness, Albert L. Sorenson, who traveled White Pine
Canyon every year from 1940 until 1950 on horseback (R.907)
followed the main trail which was rough and rocky (R.904), did
not observe any wagon tracks or roads or anyone else traveling
along the trail

rR.905).

Defendant Chris J. Candas went up White Pine Canyon
first in 1933 or 1934
year untll 1942

(R.782) and traveled the canyon every

(R.788).

He testified that during that period

there existed only a single path, a single trail about two
feet wide above the first creek cross1ng

wi~h

~rees

on both

sides that would preclude vehicles from going up because it
was too narrow (R.784).

He never saw a wagon along the trail (R. 789)

and never saw a vehicle up above the first creek crossing until
after 1951

rR. 790, 791).

He returned in 1946 and traveled the can-

yon 10 cr 12 t1mes and observed that there was basically no change
since 1941

(R. 790).

The conditions stayed pretty much the same

until 1951 when a bulldozer spent time on the road (R.791).
Defendant,

~arv

Condas Lehmer, first went up White Pine

Canyon when she was ll years old (1928), testified that the trail
had

~he

char3.cter1s~1cs

She v1sited

~he

of a :oot;;ath or a trail

(R.925,93l).

oroperty 1n White Pine Canyon in subsequent years
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(R.93l), continuously except for 1942, and returned ln

195~

and has been in the area and on the property every year since
then except for the summer of 1956 (R.932).

Up until the time

that the trail was improved as a roadway which was after 1948
or 1948, the condition of the trail had not materially changed
(R.943).

Prior to that time she had never observed a wagon or

any vehicle traveling along White Pine Canyon from the first
stream crossing up to the flat

(R.943,944).

Beginning in about

1963 she began having trouble with people driving four-wheel
drive vehicles, motorcycles and some trucks who came down Whlte
Pine Canyon from the Big Cottonwood-Park City side of the flats
and would end up in front of her cabin (R.944).

They were

stopped by the north gate and for some she would unlock the
gate and others she charged them with trespass or forced them
to go back the way they came (R.945).
The witness, Don H. Peterson, who was the foreman on
the State Road (R.879), testified that in

19~1

an attempt was

made to construct a road up White Pine Canyon with a
International cat.

(R.818).

~D-18

They abandoned the effort when the

cat. got high-centered on a boulder on a llttle steep
below Moonshine cabin (R.883).

hi~l

Beyond the point where the cat.

got stuck there was only a trail which he walked up to the
flat (R.885).

He then decided that there was no wa; to get

through the road that they wanted to get to

IR.88SI and took

the cat. back out, loaded it up and took it up to Scott's ?ass
and cleaned the road that way IR.883,884l.
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The w1tness,

Kent Christensen, testified that in 1942

or 1943 a fairly good horsetra1l existed above the first creek
crossing

(R.912,915)

and the condition of the trail did not

change from 1942 to 1950

(R.916).

The witness, Frank Marcellin,

testified to similar conditions in 1944
early 1950's

(R.856).

(R.855)

until the

The '"'i tness, James F. Mum in, testified

to similar conditions

El

the late 1940's

(R.760,762,763).

The only evidence to the contrary was the testimony
af ;;lainti::s' ?redecessor,

Peter G. Condas,

David L.

Brun1·er, Chung M:;un Lee a:1d the

Street,

Francis A.

Fred H.

?eter G. Candas testi:ied that h1s
would bring him
or a truck
comi~g

~?

s~pplies

e•:e~~

:irewood and logs cut,
and some

?eop~e

l329

e·:e~y

(R.539J

John,

up White Pine Canyon in a car 1R.S08),

day

travel~~g

:~~~~

~agons,

bringing

some ?eC?le were =raveling with trucks

were traveling with cars, going to the other

s1de o: the ::li·11de
the roads

bra~her,

In 1925 there ·,.,ere quite a few people

(R. 50?).
al~cst

Bro·..ming,

da;

( R. 510, 511 l.
1

R.Sl2).

He testi:'ied that people used

He ran sheep on his ?roperty in

and 1931 .,.,hen he lost his sheep

(R.S40)

after leased :-ns ?roperc:;· to Tracy tlright 1n 1932
to John Candas :ram .:..933 to 1967

(?.S.Jl•.

and there-

iR.540)

and

From 1929 to 1967
years

He described : t as a tra1l where you could drive a

~~e

:•:cr

Jo~.n

.~l~~es3,

·~Jr.•::a.o

F~ei

3r~wnlng,

:'r'Jrn l':S t·a L<30

testi~led

that he worked

'R . .J33:, at which time the
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road went up White Pine Canyon above Pete Candas' property

(R.487).

Some people went up there with wagons and horses and

some went up there with pickup trucks or cars, sometimes 2 or
3 times a week, sometimes once a week, or as far as every 2
weeks (R.489,490).

492).

He saw them bring logs on a wagon

(R.491,

He traveled up the road sometimes on foot and sometimes

on horseback (R.412).

He observed prints of two tracks showing

that four-wheeled vehicles had been on the road

(R.498).

Durin~

the years 1925, 1927, 1928 and 1929 he was only on the property
occasionally (deposition of Fred Browning

(R.377, 497).

The witness, David L. Street, testified that he first
went up White Pine Canyon in 1950 to take a dozer up to
establish a signal tower for the highway patrol

(R.560).

He

described the road up White Pine Canyon as passable for wagons
or trucks and cars if you would like to take your car in that
kind of place (R.560).
went up (R.561).

He did not do work on the road as he

It took two days getting up there

(R.565).

He high-centered the D-8 cat. and had to use dynamite to get
it off (R. 566).
The witness, Francis A. Brunyer, hiked up White Pine
Canyon in 1942 on three occasions and once in 1943

(R.969,9i0)

He described the road or trail as somewhat bushy, but it was net
a man-made road.

There were tracks there.

and hardened (R.969).

It was pushed dcwn

On none of those occasions did he see

anyone traveling along the trail

(R.S87J.

The witness, Chung Myun Lee,

testi:'led as an 2:<:Jert ·.v1tness
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that based on his lnspectlons of 1940 and 1950 aerial photographs
it

~as

his opinion that an unimproved road or jeep trail existed

up the bottom of White Pine Canyon (R.l032,1034), but he could
not tell whether it was man-made or animal-made (R.l036,1044,
1045) .
Plaintiff George P. Candas testified that in approximately 1945 when he was 10 years old he went up to the flats
with hls uncle, John Candas, in his sheepwagon or truck (R.57l,
j

72) .

Thereafter sometimes he would go up the canyon on a horse

or in a jeep with his cousin, George

(R.573).

He observed

people using the White Pine Canyon road from :945 up until 1971
(~.579),

except for the years 1966 and 1967 (R.581,585).

How-

ever, he never did describe the trail or road.
Plaintiff Harry P. Candas testified about the same as
plaintiff George P. Candas, going back to
}ears old (R.604)

:?~~

~he~

he was 12

for almost every year thereafter (R.606).

Plaintiff John P. Candas testified about the same since about
the early 1950's (R.674).

However, neither testified as to

the condition of the trall or road.
There was no evidence to show that any maintenance
work had been done by either the county or the State on the
Whlte Pine Canyon road above the John G. Candas cabin.
1930 until 1950 the

onl~·

From

mai:1tenance work performed by the

State was along Trottman's Lane up to the John Candas cabin
but no mai:1tena:1ce
4 6 s)

.

·tJorK.

•tJas i:)er:ormed beyond the gate (R. 464,

From 193-;" ·.mtil the prese:1t time Summit County received
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no Class "B" road funds for maintenance of any roadways South
of the John Condas cabin or gate but did receive funds for
that segment from the highway up to the gate during that
period (R. 872).
Defendants respectfully submit that the foregoing are
fair and accurate summaries of the evidence and testimony on
the issues of public road and public user in this case.

Such

testimony and evidence falls far short of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence a public road by public user
across defendants' lands.

In fact,

the overwhelming weight

of the above evidence proves otherwise.

Where, as here, it is

clear that the findings and decision of the trial court are not
supported by clear and convincing evidence, it is the duty of
this Court to reverse.

Accordingly, Findings of Fact

~os.

3,

4 and 5 must be set aside and the Decree must be reversed.
POINT IV.
THE GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT OF A PuBLIC ROAD ARE
CONTRADICTED BY THE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT
THEREON AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.
The general Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 4 and 5 make :indings
of a public road and continuous public user on foot, by horseback, in horsedrawn wagons and in trucks and cars across
defendants' lands from 1873 until 1971
specific Finding of Fact

~o.

(R.212).

However, the

9 fLnds that between 1325

a~d

1928

a wooden gate of only su:ficient width to perr.nt passage o: a
person riding horseback was constructed across the roadway at
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t:1e

so;~the:-:_/

e:1d of the pasture area

(R.213).

The latter

:indi:1g is clearly supported by the evidence

(Exh. 15-D; R.665,

667,

904, 914, 941 942)

682,

Thus,

688, 733,

751,

752, 772,

783,

903,

it was impossible for any vehicle to travel through that

gate until it was '.-.'idened in 1951

(R.l087,1089).

Likewise, specific Finding of Fact No.

9 finds that

between 1925 and 1928 the wooden gate was constructed across
~he

roadway entering the John G. Candas property on the north

line thereof

(2..22.3).

Specific Finding o: Fact

~o.

10 finds

that such wooden gate and its replacements were usually maintained in a closed and locked condition, whenever John G.
Candas and his successors were away from the property, generally
since the construction thereof until the present time and
was generally mai:ltained in a c2.osed but unlocked condition when
the·.· '.ver:e present on the ;:noperty.

It

gates ·,.;ere generall:,· posted with "keep

:~rt~er:

o~t"

:~nds

that said

or "no trespassing"

s1gns si:1ce the construct1on thereo: until the present time
IR.213).

Such speci:1c :inding is incompatible with the

r:equisite intent1on or conduct of John G. Candas or his successors to abandon the roadwa:_: to the public use.
49 l'tah 243,
109 l'tah 32S,
2d 340,

17S P.::'C. 7')3

213 P.2d 7:20

391 P.2d -126
P.2d 545

161 Pac. 1127

rl964);

rl%8);

Morris v.

Blunt,

(1916); Hall •r. :Jorth •Jgden Citv,
r1946l; Thompson\'. :Jelson, 2 Utah

.19541; Gill:nor

'1.

Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280,

?eterson ·r. Combe, 20 L'tah 2d 376, 438

and Thomson
Ll~ewise,

,,. . C::mdas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493
the foreoolng specific findings
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contradict the above general findings of public road and public
user and as such the general findings cannot stand.
A judgment which rests on some particular finding for its
validity and support may not be upheld where such finding is
contradicted by another finding treating of the same essential
matter.

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §1260, p. 212.

If, on the

evidence the trial court should make findings of fact

sa~e

necessari:~

contrary to each other, such action would be capricious and
such inconsistent findings should not be permitted to stand.
Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 Utah 2d 181, 290 P.2d 689
(1955).
The lower court was obviously concerned with the lack o:
public user resulting from the establishment of gates by John
Candas preventing use of the roadway (R.l91,192).

However, it

dismissed such concern since it had already concluded

tha~

on

the basis of Sullivan v. Candas the public road pre-dated his
acquisition of title.
on this point.

Yet its findings cannot be reconciled

If the findings prove irreconcilable, it is the

duty of the court to accept those most favorable to the appella:cc.
76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §1260, p.212.
General Finding of Fact No. 6 is clearly erroneous as

she~

by the summaries of the evidence and testimony of the vntnesses
under Point III hereinabove.

Furthermore, the distr1ct court

in Sullivan v. Candas did not find that the road up White Pine
Canyon through the lands now owned by defendants was a public
road as is demonstrated under Point II hereinabove.
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It

~allows

tha~

Finding of Fact

~os.

be set aside and the Decree being based

3, 4, 5 and 6 must

~hereon

must be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
The key issue on this appeal is whether a public roadway
can be established across the lands now owned by defendants on
the basis of the

Abs~ract

the Brlefs filed therein.

of Record in Sullivan v. Candas and
Pivotal to that issue is whether

such Abstract of ?ecord is admissible in evidence in this
case for if

i~

is not,

the evidence is wholly

establlsh a public road over defendants'
absent the foregoing

Abstrac~

·,;helmingly establishes no

insufficien~

la~ds.

to

In fact,

of Record, the evidence over-

p~.:bllc

user and no public road.

'!et ;>laint::.ffs ha·1e the ';)ur::en of establishinc "the tJublic road
o~

clea~

a~~

conv~ncing

0n the bas::.s

o~

S~.:ll::.van

erroneously a;>plled the
declded

~he

e·;~dence.

v. Candas, the trial court

2oc~rine

o~

Colla~eral

Estoppel and

case agalnst the defendants without affording them

the reassured o;>portunity -to offer rebuttal evidence of the
same caliber.

To lmplement its decision the trial court super-

imposed on defendants'

lands selected abstracted testimony

from the Abstract of ?ecord in Sullivan v. Candas and made
flnd::.ngs herein on de~endan~s'
on Sull::.van's lands.

The

ne~

lands based on findings therein
effect thereof was to retry

Sulll·;ar. '/.Candas based on a cold, ccncensed, inadmissible
abstract without the bene~lt o~ viewinc the exhlbits therein
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or hearing all of the live testimony of all of the witnesses
therein.

In so doing, the lower court here attempted to

second-guess the trial judge there who made no findings of a
public road up White Pine Canyon beyond the south boundary of
the Sullivan lands and who carefully limited the public road
therein to Trottrnan's Lane and specifically terminated it
at the gate on the south boundary of the Sullivan lands.
If anything came out loud and clear from the evidence
in this case, it was that from at least 1903 until 1950 only
a one-horse trail existed up the bottom of White Pine Canyon
which was impassable by all vehicles.

It was not until 1951

when the road was sufficiently improved to afford passage to
even a four-wheel drive vehicle.

Equally clear was that since

at least 1903 until the present time there was no public user
of the road which troubled even the lower court.
In face of the overwhelming credible evidence to the
contrary and in spite of it, the lower court found a public
road which pre-dated the acquisition of defendants'
by their father.

property

In so doing, it completely changed the

status quo of the previous 54 years and ordered defendants to
remove the gates which even it found had been maintained in
one form or another during the last 54 years, both locked and
unlocked, and posted with "keep out" or "no trespass1ng" s1gns.
This has to be a most shocking end result.
The sum and substance of it all is that the lower court
has now opened up defendants' lands to the general publlc by
establishing a public road across their lands ~h1ch ne~er
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exlS~e~

ln

~ac~

or in

la~.

~e

respect~ully

submit that the

general findings of a public road and public user must be
set aside and the Decree of the trial court must be reversed
and

t~e

case remanded

wit~

instructions to enter an Amended

Decree dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint and adjudging that
the roadway across

de~endants'

lands in White Pine Canyon is

their ;:>ri·;ate road·way and plalntiffs own no interest or right
t~ereln,

or that

~ai~ing,

a new trial.
Respect~ully

-/)

/'

/rost-Ml

submitted,

/
/ ' /;
;,o'n\.K

,

-,

(_-

Attorney for Defendants a'~
A;:>pellants George J. Candas,
Mary Condas Lehmer, Chris J.
Condas, ~ick J. Condas, Ellen
Condas Bayas and Alexandra
Candas ::Jckey
520 Con~lnen~a: Eank Building
Salt ~a~e
~tah 84101

=-=1·

day of June, 19-8,
cc~:es

.:..;::~el:an~s

~o

?.es;::oncen~s.

cf

t~e

~oregoing

:::.a:::cn :. S;:e:".cer,
::.2J: 3ene::'ic:a::_

-- -.:

::__:~e

a~torney

Tower,

Brief of Defendantsfor Plaintiffs36 South State Street,

,

/,,·a/
Attorney
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